CHANGING FLOWS OF GOODS AND PEOPLE: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE GROWTH OF HATE AND DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE (https://doi.org/10.63386/609813)

Zia Aftab* , Wamiq Ahmed*, Maja Paucelj**

Young In University South Korea*,

Maju University Karachi Pakistan,

Slovenia National University Slovenia

CHANGING FLOWS OF GOODS AND PEOPLE: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE GROWTH OF HATE AND DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE.

Abstract: This research examines the influence of trade flows, wars and human migration on social attitudes (especially understanding hostility and discrimination) in Slovenia, focusing in the period of “migration crisis” in 2015 and 2016. It examines how globalization and economic interdependence have accelerated migration, changed perceptions and created tensions in Slovenia. The paper focuses on historical migration trends, particularly after the Second World War, and highlights the economic and demographic factors that have driven migrants to Slovenia, diversifying cultural and ethnic landscapes. It examines the link between rising anti-immigrant sentiment and perceived threats to local job security, cultural identity and safety. The study also looks at the role of Slovenian and EU migration policy (which influences Slovenian migration policy) and media coverage in shaping public opinion and emphasizes the need for policies that promote social cohesion while addressing economic integration and mutual understanding. Through a comparative analysis, the study aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the Slovenian experience in the broader European migration context and argue for economic interdependence that minimizes cultural alienation and reduces the negative effects of migration.

Keywords: Democracy, goods, people, equality, rights, freedom, hate, discrimination, migration.

1. Introduction

Understanding the dynamics of migration, discrimination and social attitudes in Slovenia requires a focused analysis of how the changing flows of goods and people influence hatred and intolerance, where we will be focusing on the period of “migration crisis”, which primarily occurred in 2015 and 2016, as part of the broader European “migrant crisis”, when Slovenia became a major transit country on the Balkan migration route after Hungary closed its borders to migrants. Migration is not just a demographic phenomenon, but a multi-layered process shaped by historical, economic, and political forces. These forces create a complex interplay of benefits and challenges (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014). Migration contributes to economic growth and labor market diversification but also provokes social tensions, discrimination, and integration issues.

This paper addresses the research question: “How do the changing flows of goods and people affect the rise of hate and discrimination in Slovenia?” Migration not only contributes to economic growth and labor market diversification but also provokes social tensions, discrimination, and integration issues (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014). Central to this analysis is the concept of hatred. Defining the concept of hatred in a modern context is a challenge. Hatred can be understood as a personal or group-specific state arising from certain historical experiences or a sense of current threat. It is an intense negative emotion that can range from frustration and disappointment to deep loathing and hatred. In this research paper, we look for the causes of hostility towards migrants among Slovenian citizens. From a philosophical point of view, hatred encompasses the whole spectrum of hostile feelings that can be triggered by various factors, such as the feeling of disturbance caused by the presence of others in our environment, the threat to one’s way of life or values, and the loss of a sense of security and belonging. Scholars like Staub (2011) define hatred as a collective emotion rooted in societal structures, while others emphasize its role in perpetuating exclusion and hostility toward perceived outsiders (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). This research examines the causes of hostility toward migrants among Slovenian citizens, exploring factors such as the feeling of disturbance caused by the presence of others in one’s environment, the threat to one’s way of life or values, and the loss of a sense of security and belonging (Allport, 1954; Bauman, 2016).

The case study of Slovenia is used to examine how local socio-political dynamics interact with broader European trends to shape societal attitudes towards migration and discrimination. As an EU member state, Slovenia operates within the legal and political structures of the European Union while facing its own unique historical and social challenges. The methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis that draws on academic literature, statistical data and historical sources to assess the economic, political and social factors that influence hate and discrimination. By analyzing historical migration patterns, political conflicts and socio-economic inequalities, this research examines how these elements shape public perceptions of migration. Through a statistical analysis of migration flows and public opinion (focusing on examining the period of migration crisis in Slovenia in 2015 and 2016), it also examines how economic dependencies and changing migration patterns affect local attitudes towards newcomers. The research uses data from sources such as Eurostat and national reports to provide an empirical basis for understanding the impact of migration on societal attitudes and policy decisions.

The findings aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of migration and its societal impact in Slovenia, with implications for the broader European context. This study contributes to existing scholarship by examining Slovenia as a microcosm of broader EU dynamics, offering insights into the interplay between migration, discrimination, and societal integration. In doing so, it addresses critical questions about the balance between protecting national interests and upholding universal human rights in a globalized world.

Since migration patterns often correlate with access to economic opportunities, governance models, and institutional stability, a first step in this research will be an analysis of the impact of economic development on democracy, as this has strongly influenced the way in which the region’s democracies have evolved. Economic development is a key component in preventing the decline of democracies, as it creates a more educated and politically aware population that seeks to redirect political power to its own advantage and reduces economic inequality. Similarly, democratic governance creates a stable and transparent environment that encourages investment, promotes innovation and enables equitable distribution of development gains, which is essential for long-term economic growth. Another layer of complexity is migration, the introduction of new labor market conditions, the impact on demographic structures and reflection on the role of governance and social cohesion. In the short term, however, a one-off influx of migrants can boost the economy by relieving the labor force and increasing production and entrepreneurship. If poorly managed, migration can also strain public services, exacerbate socio-economic inequalities and increase political polarization, which could challenge democratic resilience. Specifically in relation to Slovenia and the European dimension, the relationship between economic development and democracy appears to be intertwined with migration policy, regional integration and institutional adaptability. In doing so, countries must find a balance between economic needs and democratic ideals, ensuring that both economic outcomes and policies are in line with the ideals of growth for all and the protection of fundamental rights. By analyzing these interrelationships, this research attempts to paint a detailed picture of how economic power threatens democratic governments in an era of advanced global mobility.

2. Economic development and democracy

Economic growth and the development of favorable conditions^[1] that have a positive impact on people and their environment are stimulating conditions that trigger personal satisfaction, happiness, and the will to progress. Economic development can also be understood as an economic condition that represents the process of improving the economic well-being and quality of life of a nation, a region, a local community, or an individual, in accordance with the programs or set goals of an individual nation, a state, a federation of states,…^[2] The world’s politicians are developing different projects to eradicate poverty, which was the basis for the conquest of new markets or the colonization of raw materials.^[3]. As a result, we understand economic growth as a political phenomenon that demonstrates the well-being of people and is defined as a phenomenon of market productivity measured and represented by the increase in the gross national product (GDP) of an individual country, a union of countries or even continents.

Democracy, which is considered an indicator of corporate governance, good governance, and political stability, is one of the factors that influence economic growth.[4] But what do we mean by the term democracy? Democracy can generally be understood as the rule of the people, where the power and the right to govern comes from, and is intended for the people themselves. It is assumed that the people exercise their rights directly, which is not true, as there are established models of representative democracy in which the people can only elect their political representatives and give them a mandate to govern on their behalf for a certain period. From this form emerge the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, which are otherwise unified in terms of political dominance, only the functions are divided and mean mutual control. The individual branches of government have specific functions, which they exercise within the framework of the given powers and according to their conscience, over which the citizens have no influence until the next election (Heo & Tan, 2001). The bipolar division of today’s world shows that the countries of the West are considered democratic countries and the BRICS[5] countries are autocratic or non-democratic countries where people do not have the basic rights and freedoms laid down in the Declaration of Universal Human Rights[6].

The relationship between economic development and democracy is essential for ensuring basic needs, industrial growth, and the movement of goods, capital, and labor. Industry 4.0 has accelerated this progress, particularly in developed regions such as Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia, by automating production and optimizing supply chains, including the “Just in Time” model for raw material delivery[7]. However, industrialized economies remain dependent on resources from BRICS countries, reinforcing global trade interdependence.

This trade integration drives migration, as industries in developed nations, including Slovenia, rely on low-cost migrant labor to counteract workforce shortages caused by aging populations and declining birth rates. Labor shortages are particularly severe in construction, hospitality, and healthcare, increasing Slovenia’s economic reliance on migrants[8]. However, this economic necessity often clashes with social perceptions, as migrants are sometimes seen as competitors for jobs, fueling insecurity and discriminatory attitudes.

Europe’s changing age structure intensifies the demand for migrant workers, particularly in Norway, Romania, Belgium, and the Netherlands, where labor shortages are most acute[9]. While migration helps sustain economic productivity, public concerns about job competition, wage suppression, and pressure on social services can heighten social tensions. Economic downturns and trade imbalances further amplify fears, fostering hostility toward migrants, particularly in regions struggling to balance growth and social stability.

This study explores how development disparities shape migration patterns and societal perceptions. Figure 1 illustrates labor shortages across Europe and Slovenia, with darker shades indicating greater demand[10]. The reliance on migrant labor highlights economic integration but also exacerbates negative perceptions, contributing to discrimination and xenophobia. Addressing these challenges requires policies that balance economic growth with social cohesion, ensuring that migration remains a solution rather than a source of division.

Figure 1. Labor shortages in Slovenia. Source: EURES, 2024.

The 2015–2016 migration crisis significantly affected Slovenia’s economic and political landscape. During this period, Slovenia experienced an economic downturn, as shown in Figure 2, which illustrates a decline in Gross domestic product (GDP) growth. This trend is consistent with the disruptions in the labor markets and the general economic instability that followed the crisis.

Figure 2. Gross domestic product, Slovenia, annually. Source: SiStat, 2025a.

As Figure 3 shows, there was also a decline in value-added economic activity in key sectors, which further illustrates the link between migration management and economic performance.

Figure 3. Value added by activities and GDP (NACE Rev. 2), Slovenia, quarterly. Source: SiStat, 2025b.

In addition to the economic factors, Slovenia’s democracy index also fell during this period (Figure 4), which indicates a connection between migration policy and political changes. In response to increasing migration flows, governments across Europe introduced stricter border controls and legal measures, sparking debates about the balance between national sovereignty and human rights obligations.

Figure 4. Democracy index, Slovenia. Source: Our World in Data 2024.

This period also saw a decline in public trust in institutions, as Figure 5 shows, reflecting a growing skepticism towards government structures.

Figure 5. Research – Over the past year, the Slovenian public has lost trust in almost all observed institutions in the country. Source: LJ Novice, 2023.

Economic development has far-reaching consequences that transcend national borders and influence global trade, migration patterns and geopolitical stability. As societies grow and industries develop, shifts in technology, labor markets and political structures are redefining the way nations interact. These changes affect not only economic prosperity, but also governance models, environmental sustainability and social cohesion. The increasing interdependence of economies means that development in one region can have a significant impact on other regions. The expansion of industries, advances in automation and shifts in global supply chains are creating both opportunities and challenges for labor markets worldwide. At the same time, differences in economic development between regions are driving migration flows as people seek better opportunities in more prosperous areas. These dynamics highlight the delicate balance between economic growth, political stability and international cooperation in an era of rapid globalization. Understanding these implications is critical to designing policies that promote sustainable growth while addressing the challenges associated with it. The next section examines how development affects global economic trends, changes in the labor market, and the broader socio-political landscape.

3.             Impacts of development on world changes

Differences in development between nations, countries, and continents open up a series of complex questions that often take the form of ambitions or needs for personal progress and the search for new opportunities. The crucial question is how to participate in these development processes – that is, how to contribute through economic, financial, or social mechanisms. Many people therefore choose to migrate to economically more attractive countries such as Europe, which is perceived by many as the “promised land” (Emmanuel, 2020). In this context, development opportunities represent a key research hypothesis that allows a more accurate understanding of the factors that lead European residents to react in a hostile and discriminatory manner towards immigrants from less developed areas of the world. The fundamental question, then, is whether workers and migrants from less economically developed countries can threaten the existing European social and economic order. This could serve as a basis for analyzing the causes and dynamics of the rise of hatred and discrimination against “other” people, i.e. people from socially and economically different environments.

In the past, people migrated due to various needs – the need to discover new natural resources, the need to explore, the desire to work, or they were forcibly emigrated[11] – as slaves (slavery was interpreted as the status of a person owned by someone and exercising a property right, which they even enshrined in law in the form of a property right, whereby the slave was equal to property (owner’s property right), due to which the owner could sell such a person)^[12]. With the extraction of natural resources and the need for labor, workers were brought in, especially from the Far East and Africa, to serve the economic development of Europe and especially some countries that had the right to colonize[13]. The period of slavery is an important element in the historical analysis of human migration (Brace, 2004; Finnemore, 1996).

For ease of presentation of the considerations in this article, we will use the classification of the world’s countries into developed economies, economies in transition, and developing economies[14]. Otherwise, we are aware that the division of the world into developing and emerging economies has become increasingly problematic in recent decades, but as it remains entrenched in legal documents, foreign policy discourse, and colloquial usage, we will summarize the discourse to highlight migration trends and use it in this article. In the figure below, we see the countries that are defined as developed economies and which are also the destination countries of migration.

Figure 2. Developed economies.Source: United Nations, 2014.

Economies that define themselves as “developed” achieve high levels of economic prosperity, technological progress, and social stability, including factors such as high GDP, advanced infrastructure, and widespread access to education and health services.[15] These characteristics of developed economies also have a significant impact on global migration patterns because they create attractive conditions for individuals from less developed regions seeking better employment opportunities, education, and quality of life. For instance, high wages, superior healthcare systems, and access to advanced technology in developed countries serve as pull factors, encouraging migration flows from economically underdeveloped areas.

The reverse analysis approach offers a deeper insight into commodity flows, where one can observe the arrival of raw materials in European industry and the return of finished products to the markets of economically less developed countries, promoting the flow of information and creating the need for constant adjustments. This process raises issues of globalization and dominance in the handling and trade of raw materials, energy products and manufactured goods, with the economically developed countries[16] – those with significant economic, industrial, commodity, financial, market and military power – regulating these flows in accordance with their interests and often subjugating less developed countries economically[17], similar to the historical period of colonization.

We should note that economically or militarily powerful countries often provoke conflicts and wars that block access to food, drinking water and other basic means of survival, forcing people in the economically less developed parts of the world to look for alternatives for their survival. This leads to migration flows and the entry of different nations, cultures, religions, colors and beliefs into European countries, including Slovenia. Years ago, Zelenika predicted changes in traffic and the flow of goods in his works and predicted progress and economic growth in Europe and the Western world[18]. In this concept of economic development, we can recognize many elements that today have a decisive influence on the flows of goods and migration trends that arise in the context of global economic integration. Trade flows are one of the most important drivers of global economic interdependence, as they influence relations between nations and affect migration patterns, labor markets and economic development. As industries grow and supply chains become more complex, the flow of goods, services and capital becomes the arbiter of economic power. In the past, trade globalization enabled rich countries to import raw materials from poor countries and export high-value manufactured goods to those countries, negatively impacting economic dependence on the powerful and reinforcing the dynamics of collective power objectives.

In this changed environment, trade has become not only an economic phenomenon, but also a political and strategic resource. Key resources such as oil, gas, rare minerals and trade in agricultural commodities are often at the center of geopolitical rivalries, and trade policies, tariffs and economic sanctions determine relations between countries. Economic blocs such as the European Union, the BRICS and regional trade agreements make trade a tool to exert influence and remain competitive in a multipolar world. Increasing automation and innovation in the supply chain Government regulations in favor of the digital economy. The emergence of Industry 4.0, as well as real-time tracking and the “just-in-time” metaphor for production, means that efficiency and cost effectiveness are becoming the focus of trade strategies around the world. However, these developments also pose risks, including supply chain vulnerabilities, economic imbalances and increased competition for control of trade routes and resources. In order to assess future global developments, it is important to understand how these trade flows affect the economic stability of the regions concerned. In the following sections, we will examine how trade relations affect international migration, economic policy and global economic transitions in the 21st century.

4.             Trade flows and the changing world

Trade flows have a considerable influence on the development of individual continents and the spread of industrial and other forms of production. These are complex international arrangements in which the influence of capital dominates, while law (such as international legal regulations) often plays only a limited role.

When it comes to the flow of goods in Slovenia, the Slovenian port of Luka Koper is often at the forefront as a “window to the world” for the Slovenian economy and the wider economic hinterland of Central Europe. Simulations predict an increase in cargo throughput in all Adriatic and Mediterranean ports, which would gradually increase the annual throughput in the port of Koper to around 28 to 39 million tons by 2030 and to 50 million tons by 2050 (OECD/ITF, 2015). In recent years, annual throughput growth of around 4% has been recorded, which coincides with the period of stable raw material flows when the industry was based on “just-in-time” raw material supply models. Economic growth in Europe and the European Union has occasionally been characterized by recessions in some areas, but these did not significantly affect the planning of raw material flows. Such periods coincided with favorable purchases of energy products, particularly fossil fuels from Russia, which consequently reduced the influence of the USA. In this context, debates have emerged in the European Union, particularly in France, where President Macron has proposed the creation of a European defense, which would involve the creation of a common European army and a possible withdrawal from the NATO alliance. This hypothetical defense model aimed to create a unified security and defense policy that would guarantee Europe’s autonomy. Despite these efforts, no unity could be achieved among the members of the European Union, which was also evident during the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic revealed the differences in the functioning of the members and the advantage that certain countries had, which is the principle of the idea of equivalence within the European Union.

When thinking about the economy of a particular country and its connection to discrimination and hatred, one must also examine the trade segment because trade influences economic stability, labor markets, and public perceptions of foreign dependency. For instance, trade deficits or reliance on imports can create narratives of economic vulnerability, which, in turn, may fuel protectionist attitudes and xenophobia. These protectionist attitudes often extend beyond trade to encompass migration. Migrants from trade partner countries may be viewed as symbolic of economic competition, leading to resentment and social polarization. In Slovenia, high import levels from countries like China are accompanied by societal fears about job security and cultural dilution. Conversely, trade surpluses can evoke competition fears, especially when local labor markets are impacted. So, if we look at Slovenia, we can see that Slovenia exports more than it imports, as can be seen in the figure below. Among major import, partners include India and China which could be perceived as competitors in providing low-cost goods or labor. Many other developing countries are included in the list with a trade presence such as Vietnam (€51,670,671.00), Indonesia (€116,871,793.00) and Egypt (€175,712,650.00).

Table 1. Import and export from Slovenia in 2023

IMPORT	AL Albania	€20,407,527.00	EXPORT	SO Somalia	€18,154,433.00
	BD Bangladesh	€27,972,585.00		KW Kuwait	€21,115,064.00
	Vietnam’s economic data	€51,670,671.00		MA Morocco	€37,411,295.00
	MOH Mozambique	€74,299,561.00		IR Iran, Islamic Republic of	€39,315,700.00
	MA Morocco	€105,443,565.00		For South Africa	€58,167,406.00
	ID Indonesia	€116,871,793.00		EG Egypt	€68,193,944.00
	EG Egypt	€175,712,650.00		IL Israel	€75,185,833.00
	IL Israel	€201,877,990.00		UZ Uzbekistan	€97,987,519.00
	TR Turkey	€904,124,963.00		Parliament of Algeria	€99,810,445.00
	SA Saudi Arabia	€1,001,118,815.00		AND India	€108,684,478.00
	AND India	€1,612,678,414.00		SA Saudi Arabia	€128,910,176.00
	NL Netherlands	€1,773,260,838.00		AE United Arab Emirates	€132,594,627.00
	HU Hungary	€2,121,459,804.00		KZ Kazakhstan	€164,481,605.00
	HR Croatia	€2,843,352,432.00		TR Turkey	€452,782,925.00
	AT Austria	€4,113,290,768.00		FR France	€1,810,807,474.00
	IT Italy	€5,913,367,245.00		AT Austria	€3,142,133,604.00
	DE Germany	€6,966,435,530.00		HR Croatia	€4,252,894,116.00
	CN China	€7,394,358,304.00		IT Italy	€4,752,944,965.00
	CH Switzerland	€9,339,648,575.00		DE Germany	€7,413,508,374.00
	00 Countries – TOTAL €57,084,306,389.00			CH Switzerland	€15,005,378,127.00
				00 Countries – TOTAL	€54,997,826,815.00

As we can see from the Figure 7, where the net trade in goods and services is reflected, we can see increase of it from the year 2015 on. This correlates with the data of European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, 2024), which cited the findings of the Survey on the perception and experience of discrimination in Slovenia, that in 2009 around 16% of respondents felt targeted by discrimination, in 2015 this figure increased to 21%. This increase was also noted in Europe as Newsletter European (2015) noted, that in the second half of 2015, the public debate was openly xenophobic and Islamophobic and a number of attacks against reception centers occurred.

Figure 7. Net Trade in Goods and Services (BoP, Current US$). Source: Trading Economics, 2025.

Within the EU, Slovenia’s export patterns reflect broader European trends. For instance, Slovenia’s strategic geographic position allows it to facilitate trade to less developed countries, such as exports to Somalia, Algeria, and Uzbekistan. However, this economic integration also raises questions about societal attitudes toward migrant labor and cultural exchange within Slovenia. While these figures demonstrate trade flows, the export of goods to less developed countries are often viewed as both an economic opportunity and a potential source of inequality. This economic interdependence can inadvertently reinforce dependency theories, wherein less developed countries rely on imports from economically advanced nations for finished goods (United Nations, 2014; Figueiredo et al., 2020)

In countries such as Slovenia and other EU member states, feelings towards immigrants can be driven by a sense of economic pressure and competition, which can lead to discriminatory practices. For instance, foreign workers had equal labor rights as citizens in law, still, discrimination is possible in practice, and conditions of exploitation occurred in some sectors (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Another good example is that of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS). The SDS positions itself as the guardian of Slovenian identity, culture, and security, portraying immigrants as threats to these values (Rahmadan, 2021). Populist movements often blame immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers for economic and social challenges, fueling fear and resentment among citizens (Rahmadan, 2021). The SDS uses alternative media and direct messaging strategies, such as slogans and visuals, to amplify its anti-immigrant narrative (Rahmadan, 2021). These platforms allow them to bypass traditional media scrutiny and appeal directly to their audience. The SDS also critiques EU policies, such as mandatory migrant quotas, portraying them as ineffective and a threat to national sovereignty (Rahmadan, 2021). According to a report by Spletno Oko migrants are the most common targets, comprising 42% of cases (Intervista, 2019).

A vast empirical literature (like Herander and Saavedra, Felbermayr, Parsons and Vézina) supports the existence of a positive relationship between migration and bilateral trade linkages, because as Figueiredo, Lima and Orefice[19] note, international migrants (especially if they are highly skilled) can provide additional information about the country of origin, thus reducing bilateral trade costs, which encourages exports from the host country to the migrants’ country of origin. We can therefore say that migrants help local companies overcome cultural barriers to trade (language, local consumer tastes, etc.) and build international business relationships. In this way, they contribute to greater integration into global markets, where goods flow more easily between host countries and their partners, strengthening trade dynamics and connecting economically less developed and developed regions. Despite these positive effects, increasing migration flows and the globalization of trade routes can create feelings of hostility and discrimination in host countries, mainly due to the perception that immigrants are taking jobs away from locals or changing existing social structures. In addition, cultural differences between migrants and natives in certain contexts can hinder social integration, leading to the emergence of prejudices and exclusionary attitudes that further increase tensions between different groups in the host society, which we will discuss in more detail in later subsections.

Data from 2015 show that Slovenia’s exports of goods and services accounted for 77.6% of GDP and trade in goods accounts for 150.8% of GDP. In 2022, Slovenian exports of goods and services accounted for 94% of GDP, indicating a high dependence on global trade and economic fluctuations. In the same year, Slovenia’s trade in goods (the sum of exports and imports of goods) accounted for 232.22% of GDP, reflecting a deep integration into global supply chains[20]. The table below also shows that exports account for a significant share of GDP in Slovenia, fluctuating between 77% and 94% in the years under review. With regard to the port of Koper, the OECD/ITF report discusses potential capacity issues and the need for infrastructure investment, and predicts that cargo throughput will increase to 50 million tons by 2050[21]. This high trade dependency makes Slovenia vulnerable to disruptions in global trade, such as tariff wars, economic slowdowns or shifts in demand.

Countries that are highly dependent on global trade often experience economic uncertainty during global downturns, which can lead to the perception that foreign workers or migrants are competing for limited resources. This dynamic can be seen in Slovenia, where economic crises (such as the 2008 recession) and subsequent downturns have been associated with growing populist rhetoric and anti-immigrant sentiment, as migrants can be perceived as a threat to local jobs and economic stability. In addition, foreign direct investment inflows show the volatility and reduced attractiveness of Slovenia for foreign investors. GDP growth is fluctuating, with strong negative growth in 2020 (-4.24%) during the pandemic, leading to a sense of insecurity, especially among the low-income population, which can lead to discontent if locals feel that migrants or foreign-born residents are receiving undue benefits. The Slovenian economy, which is highly dependent on industrial production, could attract workers from abroad to fill low-paid, high-demand jobs. However, such behavior could be perceived as direct competition by the local population, which could lead to increased discriminatory attitudes, especially in regions struggling with economic difficulties.

Trade with countries like India and China (table 1) further illustrates Slovenia’s reliance on cost-effective imports, which might be viewed as undermining local production or employment. In addition, the increase in inflation, especially in 2022 and 2023, where it reached 6.48% and 8.88% respectively, hit lower-income households harder, affecting the local population’s attitude towards immigrants, as there were public complaints that funds were being diverted to support migrants rather than the local population.

Figure 8. World Development Indicators – Slovenia (2017-2023). Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

The above-mentioned rhetoric could be seen both on social networks and in right-wing media such as Moja Dolenjska, where we can read:

“While the majority of citizens are busy surviving and businesses are busy with declining orders and providing money for increasingly taxed salaries and other expenses, while the poverty rate in the country is rising and most of the public service is on strike, the ruling coalition (Svoboda movement, SD and Left) has accelerated preparations for the reception of tens of thousands of new illegal immigrants, while shifting its focus to Palestine, euthanasia, drug use, etc. At the taxpayers’ expense, of course.”

The Slovenian police dealt with a substantially higher number of cases involving migrants illegally crossing into Slovenia from Croatia along the Balkan route in 2023 compared to the previous year. Specifically, they handled 58,193 such cases last year, representing an 84% rise from 2022 (The Slovenia Times, 2024). Moreover, these cases made up 96% of all unauthorized border crossings recorded in Slovenia in 2023 (The Slovenia Times, 2024). As we have already mentioned, this discourse was also visible on social networks, since the above-mentioned discourse, which was then adopted by the public, was also spread by prominent politicians. In the picture below, we see the entry of the leader of the largest opposition party SDS, Mr. Janez Janša, who states: “They gave the money that was intended for your grandmother to illegal immigrants. The Golob’s government calls this a balanced social policy.”[22] The publication emerged as a political campaign in June 2024 in connection with the holding of consultative referendums on the regulation of the right to assistance in the voluntary termination of life (this euthanasia referendum), on the introduction of preferential votes for elections to the National Assembly and the cultivation and processing of cannabis for medical purposes and the cultivation and possession of cannabis for limited personal use.[23] This discourse, propagated through posts like Janša’s, reflects a broader strategy to align economic and social fears with anti-immigration stances, framing migration as detrimental to the interests of the local population.

Figure 9. Facebook posts about the migrants. Source: Janša, Facebook post, December 17, 2022.

                Against the backdrop of this highly political rhetoric and the growing number of migrants, we plan to present more general trends of migration to Slovenia and their economic, social and political impact in the next phase of our research. As a transit country on the Balkan route and an EU member with a relatively small labor market, Slovenia has a complex migration management problem that involves balancing the import of migrants against social stability and economic sustainability. The reasons for the influx of migrants to Slovenia are manifold, ranging from geopolitical instability and conflict in the migrants’ country of origin to the demand for labor and demographic changes in Slovenia itself. However, migration also takes place within a broader framework that includes political rhetoric, the economic situation and the common EU migration policy. These three facets together offer a multidimensional view of how migration shapes Slovenian society and how policies and public discourse on migration influence the reality of migrants’ lives across the country.

5. Migration to Slovenia

Migration flows to Europe and consequently the current members of the European union (so also to Slovenia) have a long history, as immigration to the European continent has existed since the beginning of mankind. This section explores how migration flows, particularly in Slovenia, are influenced by economic disparities and societal perceptions, which contribute to the emergence of hostility and discrimination. By understanding these trends, we can better analyze the relationship between migration and societal attitudes within the broader European context. The recorded periods of migration date back to the 20th century, when the dynamics of migration were significantly influenced by world wars, the need for reconstruction, demographic deficits, and the economic need for labor. An important historical factor is the colonialism of Western European countries, which was linked to the exploitation of natural resources, raw materials, capital, and labor, followed by strong immigration to these countries after the end of the Second World War. This historical context demonstrates how economic dominance and labor demands shaped migration patterns, creating diverse societies but also sowing seeds of societal insecurities that persist today. These insecurities, especially in Slovenia, are central to understanding the rise of hostility and discrimination toward migrants. As a result of economic migration, European countries have gradually developed into culturally and ethnically diverse societies in which both migrants of European and non-European origin live today.

The processes of modern globalization, such as the search for new markets, raw materials, and energy sources, have accelerated migration to Europe and Slovenia, which has created the impression among societies in economically less developed regions that they are perceived as the “promised land”. In the second half of the last century, this led to certain negative reactions of the European population (including the Slovenian population) towards immigrants. Thus, hatred of those who are different – in terms of ethnicity, language, culture, religion, or education – also arises from a sense of threat, in which the inhabitants of Europe (and Slovenia) perceive insecurities regarding their employment opportunities, their security and the preservation of their cultural and religious identity.[24]

In the various periods of migration, Europe sometimes encouraged and sometimes restricted immigration, which led to the introduction of specific categories for evaluating the various migratory movements. Immigrants were divided into several categories: The first category includes labor migrants, consisting of legal (lawful) migrants who came to Europe with properly regulated permits to work, and illegal (unlawful) workers who regulated their legal status later (when they could). The second category consists of refugees fleeing the political regimes and conditions in their countries of origin.

Figure 10. Net migration Slovenia 1995-2023. Source: Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Office, (2023a)

Figure 11. Migration trends in Slovenia in 2022 and 2023. Source: Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Office, (2023b).

The Figure 11 highlights Slovenia’s migration trends for 2022 and 2023. Net migration remained positive, driven by foreign citizens (17,379 in 2022 and 13,124 in 2023), while Slovenian citizens had a negative net migration (-2,722 in 2022 and -1,596 in 2023). Immigration per 1,000 population surged, while emigration rates were stable, leading to a slight decline in net migration from 7.0 in 2022 to 5.4 in 2023. Internal migration also decreased, from 131,191 moves in 2022 to 110,720 in 2023. These trends suggest Slovenia remains a key destination for foreign nationals despite slowing overall migration growth. Slovenia’s migration trends reveal a pattern of economic attraction juxtaposed with societal tensions. While migration provides economic benefits, it also fuels fears related to cultural preservation and job security, which are reflected in the growing hostility toward foreign nationals. This dichotomy exemplifies the broader European context of economic reliance on migrants and societal pushback.

Slovenia, as a gateway between Eastern and Western Europe, has seen significant migration inflows, reflected the broader labor demands of the EU while grappled with domestic societal tensions. Despite initial concerns about cultural threats and intolerance due to ethnic or religious differences, these countries eventually focused on the economic benefits of immigration. Migration flows were characterized by historical, geographical, linguistic, and cultural connections. For example, Great Britain was a frequent choice for Poles, while Spain and Italy attracted mainly Romanians and Bulgarians.

These immigrants have successfully adapted to the new social and professional conditions while maintaining their cultural identity and contributing to diversity through the exchange of cultural values, cuisine, and tourist practices. In Slovenia, cultural events and festivals, such as the Ljubljana Festival, play a critical role in promoting understanding and cultural exchange. These initiatives aim to reduce the intolerance that can arise from increasing migration flows, reflecting broader European efforts but tailored to Slovenia’s unique cultural context.

A standardized form of education within the member states of the European Union for all students within the member states of the EU has also been achieved.[25]. Through the Bologna Process, Slovenia aligns its higher education system with EU standards, fostering internal migration for education and employment opportunities. It is about creating the European Higher Education Area, which facilitates the mobility of students and staff, improves the integration and accessibility of higher education, and strengthens the attractiveness and competitiveness of European higher education on a global scale. This process also enables internal migration, where young people have the opportunity to work anywhere in the EU.

Under the Schengen Agreement and the unified Bologna education system, perceived intolerance or hostility between the nations of the European Union has gradually diminished as EU citizens increasingly acquire a common identity of European citizenship.

However, it must be recognized that migration “is “also a controversial issue; because they bring with them the unknown, they trigger fears of the destruction of local culture, traditions, and customs, of the dominance of migrants /…/”,[26] which will form part of the findings of the present study.

Focusing on Europe as a migration destination, the discussion in following subchapter narrows to the movement of individuals from economically underdeveloped countries and their unique challenges. This analysis of migration patterns and societal responses highlights the complex relationship between economic necessity and cultural identity. Slovenia’s case reflects how economic integration can provoke societal insecurities, driving discrimination and hostility toward migrants. This sets the stage for further exploration of the socio-economic roots of these attitudes in the next sections.

6.             Migration from economically underdeveloped countries

The study of commodity flows and the movement of raw materials from economically underdeveloped countries shows that movements and migrations are closely linked to the development of industry, with capital having a significant influence on the development of the industrial sector and thus on the increase in demand for labor. Even internal population movements within the European Union could not meet the demand for labor, necessitating a soft form of labor migration from countries with lower economic development. The increase in migration flows became more evident as early as the 1980s, mainly as a result of global economic inequalities between rich and poor countries.

In May 2009, the European Commission adopted an initiative to introduce the EU Blue Card to attract highly skilled workers from less developed countries and give them access to employment in any of the participating EU Member States [27]. It is the EU’s response to the global race for talent. With the update of the Blue Card Directive in October, the conditions for entry and residence of highly skilled workers from third countries will be further harmonized by 2021, with a particular focus on sectors where there is a shortage of expertise. With these measures, the EU has become a more attractive destination for talent from less economically developed countries, whose work contributes to the development of technological innovation and the advancement of scientific achievements in the Union. This approach enables the legal immigration of highly qualified people from these countries, who use their skills to contribute to the development of cutting-edge technologies and solutions in the EU.

The figure shows the percentage distribution of total foreign population inflows to Slovenia, comparing data for 2020 with the average for 2010–2019 (Macedonia, 2022). Bosnia and Herzegovina consistently dominate as the largest source of immigrants, accounting for nearly 40% of foreign inflows in both periods (Macedonia, 2022). Serbia ranks second, followed by Croatia, North Macedonia, and Italy, each contributing a smaller but noticeable share. Other countries, such as Bulgaria, Russia, Spain, Germany, and Ukraine which are developing countries.

Figure 12. % of total inflows of foreign population in Slovenia. Source: Macedonia (2022)

Table 2. Asylum Applications Slovenia in 2021 Source: Macedonia (2022)

Year	2021
Total First Asylum Applicants	5,200 (+50.6% compared to 2020)
Top Countries of Origin	Afghanistan: 2,600
	Pakistan: 500
	Iran: 300

In 2021, the number of first-time asylum seekers rose significantly by over 50% to approximately 5,200 people (Macedonia, 2022). The largest groups of applicants came from Afghanistan with 2,600 people, Pakistan with 500 people, and Iran with 300 people (Macedonia, 2022). Since 2020, there has been a huge rise in applicants from Afghanistan, nearly 1,900 more (Macedonia, 2022).

There has been a steady increase in the number of immigrants. In 2023, Slovenia recorded a total of 33,939 immigrants from abroad (SiStat, 2023).

Figure 13. Number of asylum applications in Slovenia. Source: SiStat, 2023.

As a member of the EU, Slovenia complies with directives and agreements such as the Dublin Regulation[28], which allocates responsibility for asylum applications, and the Blue Card Directive, aimed at attracting highly skilled workers (Davis, 2020) Additionally, the Schengen Agreement facilitates free movement across EU borders, and the Returns Directive establishes common standards for handling irregular migrants (GSC, 2015; Wagner et al., 2024)[29]. In the past, Slovenia functioned within the framework of the common state of Yugoslavia, in which the inhabitants of six republics and two autonomous regions enjoyed equality, rights, and fundamental freedoms, as laid down in the common constitution. This equality also included equal opportunities in employment and education for all nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Slovenia’s independence, there were specific social and political changes that shaped Slovenia’s migration policy in a way that is not entirely comparable to the situation in other EU member states.

Immigration from the republics of the former Yugoslavia has been key to Slovenia’s demographic and socio-economic development over the last fifty years. Even after Slovenia’s independence, the direction of migration flows between Slovenia and the former Yugoslav republics did not change significantly, as many people from these republics became citizens of the Republic of Slovenia. Even today, they attract relatives, students, and friends who migrate to Slovenia for professional, educational, and personal reasons. Slovenia continues to be an attractive destination for people from the former Yugoslavia, which is due to the high regard in which Slovenia is held by the inhabitants of these countries. Citizens and immigrants from other republics of the former common country enjoy the same opportunities for residence, employment, education, and activity throughout Slovenia, which contributes to tolerant and harmonious coexistence. Cultural affinity, common customs, linguistic similarities (Slovenian is the official language in Slovenia), and, to some extent, common religious affiliation are important factors that reduce the possibility of direct intolerance or hostility between the inhabitants.

Since 2014, the migration landscape in Slovenia and Europe has changed significantly, although historical and cultural ties enabled the integration of migrants from the former Yugoslav republics. The beginning of the European migration crisis in 2015 and 2016 was a turning point. Hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers and economic migrants from the Middle East, Africa and South Asia arrived in Europe, many of them on their way to the Balkans via Slovenia. The influx of an unprecedented number of people brought political, logistical and social challenges for Slovenia, which soon became embroiled in EU migration policy and national interests. Since then, migration has played a key role in political disputes in countries across Europe. Slovenia, in particular, faces ongoing pressures in terms of border security, labor market needs and social integration. Factors such as tightened EU migration rules, stricter border regulations and changing public views have directly influenced Slovenia’s operational behavior in the area of migration management. Meanwhile, migration flows have continued against a backdrop of conflict, climate change and economic inequalities, posing long-term challenges in terms of governance, economic planning and social stability. Slovenia also has to deal with issues of internal migration, such as the increasing demand for foreign labor in construction, healthcare and agriculture, as well as finding a place for asylum seekers in Slovenian society. Economic necessity and the dynamics of public opinion in relation to migration are still an uncomfortable marriage of convenience, requiring policies that ensure economic sustainability and social cohesion. The challenge is to find a balance between what is good for Slovenia in terms of an effective migration policy that secures Slovenia while counteracting labor shortages, and what is a humane response that respects migrants’ human rights as well as integration efforts. These factors are discussed in more detail in the following sections, which analyze the policy approaches, the impact on society and the future development of migration in Slovenia and in the European context.

7.   Challenges of migration in Slovenia after 2014

The extraction of raw materials and energy products and the creation of economic, market, financial, military, and other global inequalities are key factors that encourage migration and the movement of people to countries and cities where people see a greater chance of better living conditions. In recent years, the EU has faced the largest-ever influx of migrants, which member states described as a humanitarian and political crisis between 2014 and 2016. During this period, migrants from various countries suffering from political, military, or criminal oppression tried to reach Europe by land, sea, on foot, or by boat to obtain asylum. One of the main reasons for migration has been wars and conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and African countries, which is reflected in the statistics of forcibly displaced persons, which exceeded 60 million people at the end of 2014 — the highest number since the Second World War.[30] Refugee camps were set up in the Middle East, but without adequate conditions for survival, leading to mass migration across the Mediterranean and the Balkan route towards EU countries. EU members were not adequately prepared for the arrival of such a large number of migrants, triggering feelings of fear and insecurity among the population in the face of growing numbers of people from less economically developed areas.

In 2013, the European Union laid the foundations for a common asylum policy with the introduction of the Dublin Regulation[31]. According to this regulation, the member state to which the applicant first enters is responsible for processing an asylum seeker. This significantly increased the procedures and financial burden, which led to difficulties in implementing the regulation, particularly in Greece and Italy, where the authorities often avoided the prescribed procedures due to the burden of the processes. As a result, the implementation of the Dublin Regulation[32] was temporarily suspended in August 2015. Slovenia’s strategic location on the Balkan route placed significant pressure on its infrastructure, border management, and public services during the refugee crisis. Unlike larger EU states, Slovenia faced unique challenges due to its limited resources and smaller administrative capacity, amplifying tensions among its citizens. The migration flow passed through its territory. Statistics show that between October 17, 2015, and January 25, 2016, 422,724 migrants crossed Slovenia, with Syrian nationals (45%) dominating, followed by Afghans (30%) and Iraqis (17%), while other nationalities accounted for 8%. Between 2015 and 2022, Slovenia granted asylum status to 46 people in 2015, 170 people in 2016, 152 people in 2017, 102 people in 2018, 85 people in 2019, 89 people in 2020, 17 people in 2021, and 203 people in 2022, as can be seen in the figure 11. In this period (2015-2022), 864 out of a total of 25,393 applications were approved, which corresponds to only 3.4% of all applications.

Figure 14. Number of asylum applications – total and accepted (from year 2015 to 2022). Source: SURS 2023.

The European Union and Turkey concluded an agreement[33] to limit migration flows along the Balkan route, in which the COVID-19 pandemic played an important role, as it prevented the arrival of large numbers of refugees in Slovenia and other European regions due to the risk of the virus spreading. In this context, a sense of threat arose in society, which manifested itself in fear for personal safety and the security of property. There were cases of alienation of assets such as private vehicles (used by migrants for travel), food, and essential goods, which in certain cases directly threatened the population of the European Union. In Slovenia, the influx of migrants during this period heightened pre-existing societal tensions, with citizens often perceiving migrants as a threat to cultural identity and economic stability. This perception was further exacerbated by political rhetoric and media narratives that framed migration as a crisis rather than an opportunity.

At the same time as the number of migrants increased and the public reaction became more negative, discrimination and xenophobia were on the rise in Slovenia and also in Europe on general. The association of migrants with labor market instability, national insecurity and cultural change exacerbated social divisions that fostered negative stereotyping, exclusion and, in some cases, hate speech and violence. Such fears, exacerbated by political discourse and media portrayal, had a major impact on popular attitudes, which were polarized along queer visibility lines, leading to a reinforcement of “them versus us” narratives. Discrimination against migrants took various forms, from restricted access to housing, employment and public services to overt verbal and physical attacks. The most vulnerable migrants, particularly those from the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, faced challenges to their livelihoods as well as bureaucratic hurdles and social prejudice. In many cases, the “migrants” are unaccompanied children, young women and girls fleeing war, persecution and violence, while other migrants and people in search of a better life (economic migrants) make up only a small proportion of the total number. In the panic of the refugee crises, we forgot that everyone deserves dignity, and soon the fear-driven narratives fueled by misinformation began to undermine social cohesion and integration efforts. Despite these challenges, there have been initiatives at both national and EU level to combat discrimination, improve integration and promote intercultural dialogue. However, the reality is that anti-immigrant sentiments persist and more concrete policies and public awareness efforts are needed to address the root causes of many people’s anger and fears about migrants, while making progress in managing migration with security priorities in mind, while meeting humanitarian responsibilities.

8.   Discrimination and hatred

When we look at the concept of discrimination, we try to create a definition based on historical experience, explaining that discrimination means unequal treatment of a person compared to others based on nationality, ethnicity, ethnic origin, gender, health status, disability, language, religious beliefs, age, sexual orientation, education, socio-economic status or other personal circumstances. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia explicitly prohibits such treatment, as it constitutes an act that threatens or restricts the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual. Nevertheless, it is often difficult to identify discriminatory practices, as we only speak of direct discrimination when a certain person is treated less favorably than another person in the same or a comparable situation due to certain personal circumstances such as ethnicity, religion, disability, age, or gender orientation.[34]

Figure 15. Reported official data of hate crimes in Slovenia from 2019 on (prior data are not available). Source: OSCE, Slovenia.

The study by Šabec and Pucelj (2019) examined hate speech targeting refugees and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (2015-2016 migration wave), Muslims, and covered Muslim women in Slovenia. It investigated whether the influx of refugees and migrants had led to increased hate speech against pre-existing Muslim communities and whether hate speech against covered Muslim women had grown. According to the research by Šabec and Pucelj (2019), hate speech towards refugees, migrants, and Muslims was increasing, particularly due to the migration wave. A significant correlation existed between the perception of increased hate speech and recent migration trends. Hate speech was often found on forums, social networks, and media, with public discourse also playing a role. This also correlates with the research, conducted by Velikonja (2017), which noted that hate speech and practices erupted in Slovenia in the summer of 2015 at the time of the so-called refugee crisis, and continued to this day.

During the refugee crisis, which began in 2015, Slovenia decided to put on the physical fence. And in that year, researcher Veronika Bajt (2016) noted that since August 2015, the number of anti-migration commentaries seemed to be spreading faster than ever be-fore over social media, such as Twitter and Facebook. In an attempt at curbing such blatant warmongering, individuals started reporting as hate speech various newly established Facebook groups, such as “Slovenia Guard Your Borders” (Slovenija Zavaruj Meje), “Radical Ljubljana” (Radikalna Ljubljana), “STOPMigrants to Slovenia” (STOP migrantom v Slovenijo) or “Slovenian Militia” (Slovenska milica). 

The Eurobarometer survey shows a gradual increase in discrimination over the years. While around 16% of respondents felt discriminated against in 2009, this figure rose to 21% in 2015[35]. The following figure shows that a negative perception of migrants still prevails in some European countries.

Figure 16. Attitude towards migration. Source: Eyes on Europe 2020.

The results of the survey, which was conducted by the authors Medvešek, Bešter, and Pirc, show that respondents in Slovenia generally have cautious views on immigration and immigration policy. The majority (59.6%) are in favor of stricter immigration conditions, while 65% believe that Slovenia’s demographic and economic needs do not justify increased immigration. In addition, 58.1% were against greater openness towards refugees. Although most were in favor of the restrictions, they recognized that immigrants perform important tasks in some sectors of the economy. More than half of respondents favored a selective immigration policy that focuses on recruiting highly skilled and well-educated individuals. In particular, 66.7% believe that immigrants abuse the social welfare system, 44.2% associate immigration with increased crime and 44.4% believe that immigrants undermine Slovenian culture. Similar results can also be seen in the Eyes of Europe survey. More European citizens agree than disagree with the statement that immigrants are a burden on the social system (56 agree overall, 38 disagree overall) and that they exacerbate the crime problem in their countries (55 agree overall, 45 disagree overall).

Figure 17. Public Opinions on Immigration in Slovenia. Source: (Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, 2024).

The results of the above-mentioned research are in line with the research of Zupančič and Premec, as they have shown that the inhabitants of Slovenian border areas are relatively hostile towards migrants and that they are generally afraid of migration in various aspects. They also found that the approval of the border population was higher in the past (e.g. in 2015, when migrants started to come to Slovenia en masse) than on the day of the survey, when a larger number of migrants had already been coming to this area for five years.[36]. The above results contradict the findings of contact theory, which assumes that, under the right conditions, greater proximity and regular contact between different ethnic groups or interpersonal interactions between the majority population and immigrants can effectively reduce the majority population’s prejudices against immigrants and promote positive attitudes towards diversity.[37]. The above findings therefore belong in the context of group threat theory, which assumes that the negative opinions of the population are the result of the perceived threat they see in the presence of immigrants and/or permissive integration policies that allow immigrants access to resources.[38]. Dominant groups therefore have the power to influence legislation and law enforcement to advance their interests, especially when those interests appear to be threatened[39].

The research analyses whose rights and fundamental freedoms are at risk of being violated in connection with migration. It considers both citizens of Slovenia and other EU Member States, whose personal rights and freedoms are guaranteed by constitutional and international law, as well as persons from economically less developed countries seeking similar protection. The critical question arises as to whether measures targeting migrants constitute indirect discrimination and how such discrimination can be determined.

Slovenian legislation defines indirect discrimination as a situation in which a neutral act, measure, or procedure results in a person being placed in an unfavorable position due to personal circumstances such as ethnicity, religion, disability, age, or sexual orientation. However, the law allows for exceptions where such measures are objectively justified by the legitimate purpose of the public authority or official.[40]. This definition emphasizes the need for a nuanced assessment of whether certain measures, seemingly neutral in their intention, have a disproportionate negative impact on migrants. Slovenian law also recognizes harassment as a form of discrimination[41], which it defines as unwanted conduct based on personal circumstances that creates an intimidating, hostile, or humiliating environment and affects a person’s dignity. In the present case, it is not clear who the harassment concerns, as the presence of foreigners from less developed countries, can be a burden for the citizens of Slovenia and the EU, which provide material support to immigrants with public funds, often higher than the minimum social support provided for citizens. This raises the issue of reverse discrimination, as Slovenian citizens may feel unequally treated compared to foreigners using the existing support systems.

Slovenian law also recognizes harassment as a form of discrimination, which it defines as unwanted conduct that is based on a personal circumstance, creates an intimidating, hostile, or humiliating environment, and insults the dignity of the person. In this case, the question of who is the victim of such behavior remains open: whether it is citizens of Slovenia and the EU who feel insecure about their social and economic security due to the presence of foreigners from less developed countries, or foreigners who may benefit more from the existing social support systems than citizens.

In the treatment of migrants, a behavior that the law defines as victimization can be observed in the relations between officials, non-governmental organizations, and the public. It is a behavior that exposes individuals or official institutions when they point out discrimination by officials or others, either on their own behalf or on behalf of others, thereby risking negative consequences.

Milivojević defines hate as a phenomenon that needs a trigger and a context in which people are emotionally or financially dependent, with the triggers placing the individual in a powerless and vulnerable position.[42] In our research context, it is possible to recognize the role of migration in Slovenian society as a trigger of hatred, whereby the intrusion of migrants into the social and physical environment of residents – their property, peace of life, jobs, etc. – creates a sense of threat and abuse among residents. This concerns various perceptions of negative consequences, such as environmental pollution, threats to personal safety, and violations of public order and peace, whereby migration can threaten the sense of autonomy and independence of Slovenian citizens. Cultural and linguistic differences and a different norm of behavior create a sense of vague mutual respect and security, which in turn raises questions that voters address to the power structures.

Often, armed conflicts and the restriction of trade flows trigger hatred towards certain nations, states, or confederations. In the context of the war between Russia and Ukraine, for example, a dominant negative connotation about Russia and the Russian nation can also be observed in Slovenia, while support is directed towards Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, albeit often without a full understanding of the complexity of the conflict itself.

The dominant power of large countries and confederations of states is evident in their control over raw materials, commodity flows, and economic and military power, which often translates into the spread of hatred, market monopolies, wars, and in some cases even genocide. These factors have a significant impact on the perceptions of individuals, who associate their beliefs with the attitudes of like-minded people, thereby reinforcing a sense of group affiliation and hostility towards certain groups.

Workers from Balkan countries like Bosnia came to Slovenia during socialism to work in heavy industries (Kuzmanić, 2000). This caused resentment as local workers saw them as competition for jobs. Having so many immigrant workers in places like Jesenice and Velenje led to economic and social tensions (Kuzmanić, 2000). Some Slovenians see foreign products and cultural influences as weakening their unique Slovenian identity (Kuzmanić, 2000). The importing of outside goods is a sign for some that Slovenia is losing its own culture and independence. This has helped fuel xenophobic or anti-foreigner attitudes.

According to the Eurobarometer 100 survey, in Slovenia, millennials aged 24-39 now have stronger anti-immigration views than even baby boomers aged 58-76 (Clark & Duncan, 2024). 74% of millennials in Slovenia feel negatively about immigration from outside the European Union (Clark & Duncan, 2024). This is compared to 70% of baby boomers and 73% of those aged 40-57 (Clark & Duncan, 2024). Furthermore, 35% of millennials say they have very negative feelings about immigration (Clark & Duncan, 2024). This is a higher percentage than the 31% of baby boomers with very negative views. This suggests that younger generations in Slovenia may hold more extreme anti-immigration positions compared to older cohorts. Surprisingly, millennials are even more skeptical of immigration than baby boomers, who one might expect to be more set in their ways.

Ostro (2019), describes the experiences of several refugees and migrants trying to seek asylum in Slovenia and Croatia. In many cases, the police violence described includes beatings, theft of belongings, and dropping people off far from the border. The refugees assert they have a right to apply for asylum but are ignored.

According to Bajt (2019), while migration for work is significant, particularly in sectors like construction, it is rarely recognized positively. Migrant workers are sometimes viewed as “third-class citizens,” reflecting discriminatory attitudes.  Migrants are often portrayed in media and political rhetoric as undermining economic stability by “taking jobs” or straining welfare systems. This depiction fuels xenophobia and justifies stricter immigration controls. Political and media narratives often exaggerate migrants’ economic impacts, emphasizing competition for jobs and resources, which influences public opinion and policy toward more restrictive measures (Bajt, 2019).

9.             Conclusion

This research examined the impact of trade flows, geopolitical conflicts and migration on the rise of hate and discrimination in Slovenia and in the European Union more broadly. The results show a complex relationship between economic dependencies, migration patterns and social tensions, where trade and economic fluctuations influence public attitudes towards migrants. The analysis confirms that migration flows and shifting trade dynamics can contribute to hostile sentiments under certain conditions, particularly when economic inequality and cultural differences coincide with perceived threats to job security and social stability.

One focus of this study was to examine Slovenian attitudes towards migration and whether economic self-interest translates into discriminatory or hostile expressions towards migrants, especially those from less developed regions. The results show that economically developed countries, including Slovenia, are often perceived as a “promised land” by migrants from less developed areas, which can lead to tensions between the local population and newcomers. In Slovenia, where trade accounts for a significant portion of GDP, the influx of migrant workers is both an economic necessity and a polarizing issue. While migrants fill a critical labor shortage, particularly in the construction, manufacturing and service sectors, they are often portrayed in public discourse as economic competitors. This dual perception — migrants as an indispensable workforce and as an economic burden — has fueled discriminatory narratives, particularly during economic downturns.

Furthermore, the study highlights that economic insecurity exacerbates migration-related fears, often leading to discrimination. In times of economic growth, migration is largely seen as beneficial as it contributes to labor market stability and overall productivity. However, during recessions or increased international competition, migrants can become a scapegoat for broader economic fears, with concerns about job displacement, wage suppression or pressure on social benefits leading to anti-immigrant sentiment. In Slovenia, where political debates often view migration from an economic perspective, public opinion has become increasingly polarized, with migration seen either as a solution for the labor market or as an economic threat.

The research also found that with the increase in immigration and labor migration, reported incidents of discrimination and hate speech have also increased. This correlation suggests that migration flows can contribute to social tensions, particularly when migrants are perceived as competitors for limited resources. While trade and globalization contribute to economic growth, they can also lead to economic insecurity, which in turn affects social cohesion. However, the exact link between trade fluctuations and hate crime remains speculative, as more data is needed to directly link changes in trade policy to changes in public attitudes towards migrants.

Although these findings offer valuable insights, the study has several limitations. It relies primarily on secondary sources, which may not fully capture the changing nature of migration-related attitudes, particularly in the context of recent policy developments. Future research should conduct face-to-face surveys or interviews with local populations, particularly in the regions most affected by migration, to better understand how economic conditions influence public perceptions. In addition, incorporating theoretical frameworks such as dependency theory or social identity theory could provide a deeper understanding of how economic roles and identity tensions contribute to perceived social divisions. Given the unique socio-political and economic landscape of Slovenia, the findings may not be fully transferable to the broader European context, but they offer valuable insights into the challenges faced by smaller EU economies in dealing with migration and globalization.

Further research is needed to fully understand the long-term effects of migration on discrimination and social cohesion. Future studies should include additional social and cultural factors, such as the effectiveness of migrant integration programs, the influence of EU migration policies and the role of the media in shaping public opinion. A comparative analysis with neighboring countries could provide a clearer picture of how the Slovenian migration experience relates to broader European trends. As digital media platforms increasingly shape migration discourse, future research should explore their role in reinforcing misinformation and public attitudes towards migrants.

By highlighting the economic interdependencies, cultural interactions and socio-political challenges of migration, this research underlines the need for a balanced policy that promotes both economic integration and social cohesion. In Slovenia, policy should focus on strengthening community engagement programs, ensuring fair labor protections for migrants, and conducting awareness campaigns to counter common misconceptions about the economic and cultural effects of migration. By promoting mutual understanding and responsible migration policies, Slovenia and other EU countries can mitigate the negative social consequences of migration while maximizing its economic benefits to ensure a more inclusive and resilient society.

Author Contributions: “Conceptualization, dr. Sašo Murtič and ddr. Maja Pucelj; methodology, ddr. Maja Pucelj; investigation, dr. Sašo Murtič and ddr. Maja Pucelj; resources, dr. Sašo Murtič and ddr. Maja Pucelj; writing—original draft preparation, dr. Sašo Murtič and ddr. Maja Pucelj; writing—review and editing, dr. Sašo Murtič and ddr. Maja Pucelj; visualization, ddr. Maja Pucelj; supervision, dr. Sašo Murtič. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.”

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement: All data, used in the present research, are cited in the text.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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[1] Examples of these favorable conditions include, for example, an appropriate relationship between economic growth and employment opportunities, an appropriate relationship between economic development and access to education, an appropriate relationship between economic growth and health, an appropriate relationship between economic growth and environmental sustainability/social equality, and so on.

[2] Government of British Columbia 2023.

[3] Finnemore 1996, 89–97.

[4] Karış 2020.

[5] “The BRICS is a forum for cooperation among a group of leading emerging economies. The BRICS includes 11 countries – Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates.” (International Labour Organization 2024). While some BRICS nations maintain democratic elements, others exhibit restricted civic freedoms and centralized governance models, challenging the notion of democracy as a universal standard.

[6] Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.

[7] Business world,2024.

[8] Eurostat, 2024.

[9] EURES, 2024.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Castles et al., 2005.

[12] Brace 2004, 6; Davis. 2006.

[13] Said, 1978.

[14] Barros Leal Farias 2023.

[15] ScienceDirect, Developed Country.

[16] Migration Data Portal, 2024.

[17] International Organization for Migration, 2024.

[18] Zelenika ,2010.

[19] Herander & Saavedra, 2005; Felbermayr, 2011; Parsons & Vézina, 2012; Figueiredo, Lima, & Orefice, 2021.

[20] World Bank, 2015a; World Bank, 2015b; World Bank, 2022a; World Bank, 2022b.

[21] OECD/ITF, 2015.

[22] Janša, Facebook post, December 17, 2022

[23] Družina, “Volivci podprli vsa referendumska vprašanja, tudi o evtanaziji”.

[24] Marozzi 2015.

[25] European Commission, 2024a.

[26] Zupančič and Premec 2021, 53.

[27] European Council, n.d

[28] Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (European Union 2013c).

[29] We can point some EU directives and pact’s as example of such compliency: a) New Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in 2024 (European Commission 2024c), b) Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, (commonly known as the “EU Blue Card” directive) (European Union 2009), c) Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (European Union 2011), d) Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (European Union 2013a), e) Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (European Union 2013b).

[30] UNHCR 2015.

[31] Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (European Union 2013c).

[32] Ibid.

[33] European Council 2016.

[34] Act on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment 2007.

[35] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Survey on the Perception and Experience of Discrimination in Slovenia”.

[36] Zupančič and Premec 2021.

[37] Allport, 1954; Medvešek, Bešter, and Pirc 2022, 29–47.

[38] Medvešek, Bešter, and Pirc 2022, 29–47.

[39] Vogel and Messner 2024.

[40] Protection Against Discrimination Act 2013.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Milivojević 2008.